The world according to Norman

Norman Davies is the foremostczołowy historian of Poland in the English language.

For many foreigners, his books are the first stories of Poland they ever read. For many Poles, he is far more than a historian, he is a cultural diplomat to the English-speaking world.
Davies' trip to Poland last month was a celebrity'scelebrity: sława whirlwindpośpieszne tournee, which included the receipt of a cultural awardotrzymanie nagrody kulturalnej and a tightly-packedzapchany media scheduleplan, grafik. No surprise then, that the only place Davies could agree to for an interview was on the movew drodze, w ruchu, in a train compartmentprzedział w pociągu on a journey from Warsaw to Kraków.
"I ended upto end up: skończyć (na/jako), wylądować in Poland by mistake," says Davies, looking out of the train carriage across the flat, snow-coveredpokryte śniegiem Mazowsze fields. Davies was meant to have gone to the USSR as an Oxford student in the 1960s, but because of visa complications, came to Poland instead. "I realized back then that even though I was a history student, I didn't know anything about the history of this part of the world."

Davies' realization as a student, that Polish history has been obscuredobscure: przesłaniać, niejasny, was to be echoedto echo: rozbrzmiewać throughout his work, right up to his most recent publication. But his interest in looking at the world from a Polish perspective seems to have opened up a taste for turning history upside down"wywrócić" historię do góry nogami, which has drawn some harshostry criticism.
He has written a history of the British Isles with a new perspective from the Celtic lands, as opposed to the traditional biasuprzedzenie, stronniczość towards England. In Europe: A History he has not claimed to write 'the' comprehensivepełny, wszechstronny history of Europe but 'a' history, seeing the continent from the perspective of Central Europe rather than from the traditional viewpointsviewpoint: punkt widzenia of Paris and London, even going so far as to include maps that we have never seen before, turned ninety degrees so that Budapest and Warsaw at long last seem as prominentważny, wybitny as their Western European counterpartscounterpart: odpowiednik.
Rising 44, his history of the Warsaw UprisingPowstanie Warszawskie, which has its sixtieth anniversaryrocznica this year, again sets out to compensateto compensate: rekompensować for a historicalhistoryczny imbalancenierównowaga. This event, so prominentważny, wybitny in the minds of the eldest generation of Warsaw residents (many with vividżywy, jaskrawy childhood memories of the Uprising), is virtuallypraktycznie, prawie (że) unheardniezauważony of in Britain. But for Davies, this is just one aspect of a general lack of knowledge that the British and much of the world have about Central and Eastern Europe.

In an opinion column in The Times of London two months ago, Davies described the British prejudiceduprzedzony view of the new entrantsentrant: uczestnik, kandydat to the EU, that they are "Tiny, poor, nationalisticnacjonalistyczny, troublesome, and above all, culturally alienkulturowo obcy, wyalienowani. They speak obscure languages. They take inordinatenadmierny prideduma in their eccentric histories." With Rising 44, Davies is again trying to clarifyto clarify: wyjaśniać Poland's "inordinatenadmierny prideduma" for the English-language reader.
But he goes further. Davies argues that the British and American "...war-time love affair with the Soviet Union blinded them to realityprzesłonić rzeczywistość," a voluntary blindnesscelowe niedostrzeganie czegoś that extendedto extend: rozciągać się, powiększać from the political leadershipkierownictwo, przywództwo to the press, unwilling toniechętni, aby see the first battle of the Cold War already being fought on the streets of Warsaw.
"Nobody would have dreamed of telling the French ResistanceFrancuski Ruch Oporu that it was anti-American to take Paris. But the Polish uprisingpowstanie was seen as anti-Russian, its heroes were described as criminals," says Davies.
He sees the events of 1944 as an example of a "coalition that went wrong," an important reminderupomnienie, pamiątka to Poles about the present and the near future. "When I was writing [Rising '44] there was another coalition being put together, on rather dubiousniepewny, podejrzany foundations. Less powerful partners are more vulnerableczuły, podatny to the whimsfanaberie, kaprysy of the great powers."

Davies sees Poland's camaraderiekoleżeństwo with America in Iraq as history repeating itself, of Poland as a middle-sized country offering itself up to win favor of a great power. But the great power can do what it likes, and has no need to return Poland its favors.
"Poland has always been in this category of being big enough to play with the big players, but of not being strong enough to play on an equal basis with them," comments Davies. "Therefore they are liablepodatny na coś, narażony na to be a casualtyposzkodowany. It was the case with Napoleon and it was the case in the Second World War." By being part of the 'Coalition of the Willing' Davies argues that Poland is playing with fireto play with fire: igrać z ogniem yet again.
"If we had a balanced, healthy group of people running U.S. policy then there really would be a sense of partnershippartnerstwo," says Davies, "But not with types like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, even Cheney."
In the presenceobecność of President Kwaśniewski on May 3 last year, Davies repeated these concernsniepokoje, "I said that Poland is in Europe and not in America. Poland's primary role must be in Europe. Kwaśniewski cannot afford to defyto defy: przeciwstawiać się, sprzeciwiać się the French and Germans indefinitelybez końca."
But Davies is not proposingto propose: proponować a Polish foreign policypolityka zagraniczna about-turnzwrot o 180 stopni. Rather, he would like to see an intelligently steered course between the U.S. and the Franco-German alliancesojusz in Europe. This is because he is optimistic about Poland's future role in the European Union.

"The French and Germans are bound to losez pewnością stracą the leading role in the EU that they've had for forty years," says Davies, "Two countries cannot dictate to twenty-three others." Davies looks to increasing diplomatic cooperation between the British, Spanish and Poles to shapekształtować the new European Constitution, and to ensureto ensure: upewnić się that no European nation, be it small or medium-sized, is ever isolated. "The future is not with Rumsfeld's 'New Europe' but with variablezmienny alliances and diplomatic permutations which will be constantlyciągle, stale changing shape," says Davies.
Davies is prouddumny of Polish negotiators' fighting spirit at the EU Constitution talks. "In the next stage of negotiations the other partners, particularly France, will talk to Poland rather differently than they did before," says Davies. But his point is that Poland's international message must be that it stands up for itself, not that it wishes to disruptprzerywać, wywoływać przerwę European integration or align itself too closely to an axisoś with Washington.

For Davies, this is where Poland's raised military profile in coalition with America over the past year can be put to good use. "It can't do Poles any harm to have a raised profile so that when they negotiate, people take them more seriously," he says, "Kwasniewski saw an opportunitymożliwość, okazja to raise Poland's profile. That was not a bad thing, but raised international profile is as far as it goes. Economic or financial reward in Iraq does not necessarily follow."
Davies says that there is a Polish tradition of fighting against the oddspomimo wszystkich przeciwności, which has brought tangiblenamacalny, faktyczny reward. When politicians in Paris and Berlin know that Polish special forces where among the first combatants in Iraq last year, it demonstrates Polish political will.
Looking back to the Warsaw UprisingPowstanie Warszawskie, though it was finally defeatedto defeat: pokonać by the Nazis as the Soviets looked on from the east bankbrzeg of the Vistula, Davies says the event had a lasting impactwpływ on Soviet treatment of Poland.

"There is no doubt in my mind that the Soviets treated Poland relativelystosunkowo, względnie gently after the Warsaw Rising," says Davies, "Look what Khrushchev did to Hungary in 1956. Why didn't he do that in Poland at the same time? Because the Soviet Union knew they would have an even mightierpotężniejszy, mocniejszy fight on their hands in Poland."
For Davies, Poland's military presenceobecność in an American-led coalition adds a new dimensionwymiar to relations with Israel and the international Jewish community: "Polish foreign policypolityka zagraniczna and most educated Poles are very pro Israeli. But remembrancepamięć and shared history become very complicated. We want to remind the forgetfulzapominalski world what the Poles of Warsaw did in 1944. That is not in any way a conflict with the remembrancepamięć of the Holocaust. After all, there was a sizablesporych rozmiarów Jewish contingent in the Home Army."
Davies points outto point out: wskazywać (na coś) that one of the problems of the history of the Warsaw UprisingPowstanie Warszawskie of 1944 is that it has been confusedto confuse: mylić (coś) with the Warsaw Ghetto uprisingpowstanie of 1943. "The history of the holocaust has become so dominant in education and popular writing that most people in America and Western Europe could not tell you accurately what happened in Eastern Europe during the war," says Davies.

Davies recallsto recall: przypominać the Chancellor of Germany's invitation to the fiftieth anniversaryrocznica of the Warsaw UprisingPowstanie Warszawskie in 1994. "He accepted the invitation," says Davies, "...and said how moved he was to be invited to the anniversaryrocznica of the Ghetto Rising. He later made a wonderful speech about reconciliationpojednianie."
Davies says that he has heard a rumorplotka that President Bush has been invited to the sixtieth anniversaryrocznica of the start of the Warsaw UprisingPowstanie Warszawskie in August this year. Although he admits that the visit is unlikely, he says that in the event of it happening it would be the last big occasion for the history of the Uprising to be accurately remembered.
Nevertheless, the issuekwestia, sprawa of the Warsaw UprisingPowstanie Warszawskie is and will remain hugely controversial in this country, on the subject of whether there was a conspiracykonspiracja, spisek to ensureto ensure: upewnić się its failureniepowodzenie, and whether it should have been attempted in the first place.

Warsaw as we know it today, the Stalinist architecture of Marszałkowska, the Palace of Culture and the commemorativepamiątkowy crosses of Nazi firing squads on each street corner (which conspicuouslyw sposób zwracający uwagę fail to mention that they mark events of the Warsaw UprisingPowstanie Warszawskie), has been shaped by the defeat of the Uprising of sixty years ago. But as a lasting assertionzapewnienie, twierdzenie of Poland's will to achieve libertywolność, it was a marked victory.
In the late 1960s, while living in Kraków, Davies turned downto turn down: odrzucić an offer to work for Polish intelligencewywiad. By bringing this knowledge to the English-speaking world, Norman Davies is indeed (and apparently by accident) serving as Poland's unofficial ambassador.

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